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Anti-poverty programs often rely heavily on the existing fiscal federalism. The central
government-aiming  to fight poverty nationally-targets  poor provinces, leaving provincial
governments to reach their own poor. This is administratively and politically easier than finer
targeting, and appears to be increasingly common.
The literature on fiscal decentralization has often emphasized the importance of central
redistribution between lower levels of government. 2 It is also recognized in principle that the
outcomes will depend on the behavior of provincial governments. 3 The latter need not share the
center's objectives, or may face different constraints in pursuing them, such as tighter financial
constraints, or constraints arising from the existence of mobility.4 Without successful efforts by
provincial governments to target their poor, even dramnatic  redistributions rich provinces to poor
ones may have little impact on poverty nationally. 5
One can expect provinces to differ in a number of ways that could matter to the welfare
outcomes of federal programs.  Some provincial governments will no doubt care more about the
poor than others; one often finds heterogeneity in such "social preferences" even within one
country.  However, outcomes could differ even without differences in the social preferences of
2  The classic  treatment  is Oates (1972). Recent  discussions  include  Bahl and Linn (1992), Shah
(1994), and Bird et al., (1995),  and Inman  and Rubinfeld  (1997).
3  As one textbook  on public  finance  puts it: "Since  the central  authorities  do not control the local
authorities,  the effects of federal  programmes  need not be those intended;  and the central  authorities  must
take the reactions of the communities  into  account" (Atkinson  and Stiglitz,  1980,  p.55  1).
4  On the implications  of inter-jurisdictional  residential  mobility  for efforts to target the poor in a
federal system see Brown  and Oates (1987). Competition  between  provinces,  given  capital mobility
across  jurisdictional borders,  can also influence  provincial  spending  choices  (Keen and Marchand,  1997).
For evidence  see Datt and Ravallion  (1993) and Ravallion  (1993).
2provincial governments.  One of the relevant differences between provinces is how poor they are.
In Argentina, for example, the poverty rate (as typically measured in that country) is over three
times higher in the poorest province than in the least poor.  Poorer provinces may well have a
harder time giving priority to the poor, while still being within the budget constraints set by the
center. The fact of being a poor province could thus diminish performance in reaching the poor
though public spending.  If borne out by the evidence, this holds implications for understanding
why spatial concentrations of poverty persist in the absence of suitable redistribution from the
center; poor provinces get poor governments, which perpetuate their poverty.
This paper explores these issues for a program in Argentina, which is studied before and
after a World Bank supported reform and expansion. By studying a specific program at one time
in one country, I hope to identify effects which would otherwise be hard to isolate. A measure of
success at poor-area targeting is proposed, namely the regression coefficient of program spending
on the welfare indicator. A decomposition of this measure is used to assess the contribution of
the center's provincial reallocation-versus  intra-provincial targeting-to  the program's  overall
performance. Armed with a consistent measure of performance at province level, the paper then
investigates the determinants of why some provinces did better than others at reaching their poor
areas, and what implications this might hold for the center.
The following section outlines a simple theoretical model of targeting in a federal system,
which helps motivate and interpret the subsequent empirical analysis.  Section 3 describes the
program.  The measure of performance is discussed in section 4, while section 5 presents the
overall results.  The inter-provincial differences in performance are studied in section 6, while
section 7 discusses some implications of the results.  Section 8 concludes.
32.  Are poor provinces worse at reaching their poor?
Federal anti-poverty programs often target poor provinces, in the hope of reaching poor
areas within them.  But could it be that the governments of poorer provinces are less effective at
reaching their poor?  And if so, how does that affect the case for targeting poor provinces?
Consider a federal system comprising many provincial governments and one central
government. 6 The center wants to reduce poverty nationally, but it must rely on the federal
system to channel resources to the poor.  Why might some provincial governments give greater
emphasis to targeting the poor than others?  Differences in how much is received from the center
are part of the answer; extra resources can no doubt buy more effort at targeting.  Another factor
is how poor the province is on average. If the poor are already receiving more than the non-poor,
then a province with a higher poverty rate will have a harder time improving its targeting while
keeping within its budget constraint. Poor provinces will be less able to afford targeting their
poorest areas. Against this effect, poor provinces may well be able to attract more money from
the center, so as to improve targeting within the province. This section formalizes this argument,
which will help motivate and interpret the subsequent empirical analysis.
There are "poor"  and "non-poor"  people within each province, and public spending is to
be allocated between them. The provincial government attributes a net benefit Bp(Tp)  to its
spending on a poor person Tp,  and B,(T,)  to its spending Tn  on the non-poor. Various
interpretations of the Bi functions are possible; for example, they could be thought of as expected
votes in an election, or as normative "social preferences".  They can be taken to subsume other
exogenous variables, and interpreted as expected values over the distribution of any random
6  An alternative  interpretation  is multiple  national  governments  and one international  multilateral
aid donor,  such as the World  Bank. Multiple  donors  would  complicate  the analysis,  however.
4variables  influencing  the benefits from making  transfers  to a given group.  I assume that B1(T,) is
smoothly  increasing  and strictly  concave  for i=p,n. A proportion  Np of the population  is poor.
The provincial  government  chooses Tp  and Tn  to maximize  total benefit:
NpBp(Tp)  + (l-NNp)Bn(Tn)  (1)
subject  to its budget  constraint:
NpTp  +  (I-Np)Tn  =  T  (2)
Let the optimal  allocation  to group i be TXNp,T),  which  equates  marginal  benefits across  the two
groups,  Bp'(Tp)  = Bn'(Tn)  (as  well as satisfying  equation  (2)).7
How will differences  in the poverty  rate influence  the spending  decisions  of provincial
governments? On letting T  denote  the partial derivative  of Ti with respect  to x, it is readily
verified  that:
TPN=  (Tn  - Tp)T'T  (3.1)
T'  = (Tn  - Tp)Tn'  (3.2)
where
T'T  = Bn"(Tn) L  >0  (4.1)
T'T=Bp"(Tp)J'  >0  (4.2)
and
J_  NpBn"(Tn)  + (l -Np)Bp"(Tp)  < 0  (5)
7  Note that when the Bi functions  depend  explicitely  on a vector  of exogenous  variables  these will
then  (in  general)  appear  in the solution  functions  T,.  The  empirical  work  will introduce  other  influences
on poor-area  targeting  by the provinces,  but they are ignored  for now.
5Thus TPN > 0 if and only if Tn  >TP,  and similarly  for T' N.  Amongst  provinces  which  are
targeting  the poor (TP  > Tn), the amount  received  by the poor will fall as the poverty  rate rises.
How will the poverty  rate influence  the extent of pro-poor  targeting?  A key factor is the
shape  of the provincial  government's  social preferences.  Here I assume  that provincial  targeting
behaves as a "normal good", meaning  that a higher allocation  to a province  by the center  will
improve  the province's targeting  performance  as measured  by Tp  - T,. Then TPT - Tn  =
(Bn"(Tn) - Bp,"(Tp))J-1  > 0. The effect of differences in Np on the extent of targeting is given by:
TpN -T'1N = (Tn - Tp)(T pT  - T1nJ)  (6)
It can be seen that TPN - T'nN has the same sign as Tn - TP  when a higher budget allocation to a
province  improves  its targeting  performance.
One can summarize  these  results as follows:
Proposition ):  If the poor are already receiving more than the non-poor and targeting at
province level is a "normal good",  then at any given budget allocation from the center, the
extent ofpro-poor  targeting by the provincial government-measured  by the absolute difference
between the allocation to the poor and that to the non-poor-as  well as the absolute amount
received by the poor, will be lower the higher the poverty rate in the province.
How then should  a central  government  allocate  its budget  when aiming to reduce  poverty
nationally? In particular,  should  it allocate  more  to poorer  provinces? To sharpen  the analysis,  I
assume  that the center's sole objective  is to maximize  the amount  received  by the poor,
irrespective  of which province  they live in.
6In the absence of a federal system, the center would target the poor directly, and it could
then achieve perfect targeting in this model. 8 Provincial boundaries would then be irrelevant to
the outcomes; there will be no horizontal inequality, in that equally poor people will receive
equal allocations.  However, in a federal system, the center's choices must be consistent with the
choices made by the provincial governments, conditional on the center's actions.
Decentralization within a federal system thus entails an incentive compatibility constraint on the
center's allocation problem. How then should provincial differences in average poverty rates
influence the center?
The center maximizes the (population-weighted) sum of Tp(Np  T)Np over all provinces,
subject to a national budget constraint. 9 I assume that Tp(NpT) is concave in T.  This is not
implied by the assumptions made so far, but it will hold in special cases. For example, it will
hold if B,70'(Tp <Oand  B,"'(T)  = O-a special case I will return to.  Concavity in Tassures that
there is an interior solution to the center's optimal allocation, equating Tp(Np, T)Np across all
provinces.  Without this restriction, some provinces will receive nothing from the center; the
following analysis can then be taken to apply to the remaining provinces.
The optimal allocation to a province is implicitly a fumction  of the province's poverty
rate. A sufficient condition for the center's allocation to be increasing in Np is that TPT  is non-
8  More general formulations  would allow  for other information  and incentive  constraints  on
targeting,  but these can be ignored  for the present  purposes.
9  An argument  often made in favor of decentralized  poverty  programs  is that the provinces  may be
better informed  about poverty  locally  than is the center. This can be readily incorporated,  without
changing  the argument  to follow in any essential  way, by postulating  that Tp  is also a function  of some
latent  random  variable  unobserved  by the center but with known  distribution.  The center's problem is
then to maximize  the (population-weighted)  sum over all provinces  of the expected  value of TpNp,  the
expectation  being  formed  over the distribution  of the latent  variable.
7decreasing in NP (or, equivalently, that T'N  is non-decreasing in T).  This can hold under the
same conditions as in Proposition 1. Thus we have:
Proposition 2: A central government aiming to reduce poverty nationally should target
poor provinces-even  when they are less effective at discriminating in favor of their own poor-if
its budget allocation and the provincial poverty rate have cooperant effects on the propensity of
a province to spend on the poor.
While the center may be justified in targeting poor provinces even when they are less
effective at reaching their poor, this need not yield the maximum reduction in poverty nationally.
Suppose that a higher allocation to a province reduces the marginal impact on transfers to the
poor of a higher provincial poverty rate (a more negative marginal impact when the province is
already targeting the poor). Then it can be optimal for the center to give a higher allocation to
less poor provinces if it is to maximize the gain to the poor nationally.
Negativity of TP TN cannot be ruled out.  Consider again the case in which Bp"'< 0 and
B,"'= 0. Then it is readily verified that:
TPTN = -Bn"(Bn"-Bp")  J-2 <  0  (7)
(continuing to assume that pro-poor targeting is a normal good). If this is sufficiently negative
(the elasticity of TPT to Np  is less than -1) then the central allocation which equates Tp{Np, T)Np
across all provinces will entail a higher allocation to provinces with lower values of Np. So one
cannot easily rule out the possibility of a "perverse"  case in which the targeting behavior of the
provincial governments entails that the best strategy for a central government aiming to fight
poverty nationally is to target less poor provinces.
8Notice that there are two effects  of a higher poverty  rate at the provincial  level on
performance  at reaching  the poor within the province. Under  the condition  in Proposition  2,
these two effects  will work  in opposite  directions. Poorer  provinces  will perform  less well at
reaching  their poor at any given budgetary  allocation  from the center,  but they will also attract  a
higher allocation  a central  government  aiming  to reduce  poverty  nationally,  and this will improve
their performance  at targeting. Later  we will see whether  the data  on the Argentinean  program
are consistent  with this model,  and determine  which  of these two effects  dominates.
3.  Argentina's  Trabajar  Program
With financial  and technical  support  from the World  Bank,  the Government  of Argentina
introduced  the "Trabajar  2" program  in May 1997. The program  aims to reduce  poverty  in two
ways. Firstly,  by providing  short-term  work at relatively  low  wages,  the program  aims to self-
select  unemployed  workers  from poor families.  Secondly,  the scheme  tries to locate  projects in
poor areas. The projects are proposed  by local governmental  and non-governmental
organizations  who  must cover  the non-wage  costs. The projects  have  to be viable  by a range  of
criteria,  and are given  priority according  to ex ante assessments  of how well targeted  they are to
poor areas, what benefits  they are likely  to bring  to the local community,  and how much the area
has already  received  from the program. The workers  cannot be receiving  unempoyment  benefits
or be participating  in any other  employment  or training  program.  It appears  unlikely  that the
program would  affect  residential  location,  though of course  workers  may commute.
As the name suggests,  Trabajar  2 replaced  a prior program,  Trabajar 1. The new program
entailed  a substantially  greater  level of spending;  within five months  of commencement,  Trabajar
2 had disbursed  more  than double  the spending  on Trabajar 1 over the previous  year, involving
9an expenditure by the center of over $100 million, with 250,000 workers participating.  In
addition to a greater overall budget, a number of features of Trabajar were changed under
Trabajar 2. The poverty focus of the program was strengthened by putting greater emphasis on
reaching poor areas. Poverty measures were included in the center's budget allocation rules and
in selection criteria for projects (based on a points system which gave higher priority to projects
proposed by poor areas).  The poverty focus was also made clearer to provincial administrators.
The reforms entailed some sizable changes in the center's budget allocation across
provinces. Figure 1 plots spending per capita on the programn  by province under Trabajar 2 (May-
September 1997) against that under Trabajar 1. While there is a positive correlation (of 0.58,
significant at the 5% level), there were some large changes in the provincial allocation. Later we
will see how effective these were in improving the program's  ability to reach poor areas.
The benefits to the poor from this program will depend in part on the ability of local
communities to propose and cofinance viable projects.  Better off areas will undoubtedly have a
comparative advantage in this respect and so be the first to gain.  Poorer provinces tend to be
more severely constrained in cofinancing projects.1 0 Thus the germ of a possible problem in
reaching poor areas lies at the heart of the program's  design, whereby the center only provides
the labor share of the cost of sub-projects, leaving the cofinancing up to local areas.  To some
extent the design features of Trabajar 2, including preferential treatment of sub-project proposals
from poor areas, will help get around this problem.  We will see how well they do below.
The rest of this paper tries to assess how well Trabajar 2 performed in reaching poor
areas, whether this improved over Trabajar 1, and why. The empirical work draws on the
10  There is a correlation  of -0.73  between  the share of total sub-project  costs which were cofinanced
and the provincial  poverty  rate (using the measure  described  below).
10program's information  system set up by the Ministry  of Labor in the Government  of Argentina.
Data were available  for the first six months of the program's operation,  May to October 1997.
4.  Measuring  performance  in reaching  poor areas
There is a literature  on measuring  the performance  of provincial  or local governments  in
delivering  public  services  based  on stochastic  frontier  models,  assuming  a common  set of cost-
function  parameters  across  all provinces  (see, for example,  Deller, 1992,  and Davis and Hayes,
1993). Here we face a different  problem:  the parameters  vary across  provinces,  and it is that
variation  which we want to identify  and explain.
The spatial variances  at the level below  the province  can be exploited  for this purpose.
The geographic  level below the province  in Argentina  is the "department"  ("partido"  in Buenos
Aires),  of which  there are slightly  over 500  nationally.  A poverty  measure  is available  for
assessing  performance  in reaching  poor departments,  namely the proportion  of households  with
"unmet basic needs" (UBN),  based  on the 1991  census. This is a composite  index of deprivation
with respect  to indicators  of residential  crowding,  sanitation  facilities,  housing quality,  education
attainments  (of adults),  school  enrollments  (of children),  employment  and dependency.  Since  it is
based  on the census,  the UBN index  covers  the whole  population,  and so is representative  at a
low level of geographic  aggregation. The index is somewhat  out of date (5-6  years prior to the
Trabajar  program),  however,  and the composition  and weighting  of the component  indicators  is
not beyond question. Nonetheless,  the UBN index  is the best information  available  for the
present  purpose. It is also the main information  used by provincial  offices  in setting  priorities  for
Trabajar  sub-projects,  although  it can be expected  that most provinces  will also have access to
miscellaneous  ad hoc indicators  of poverty,  which  may well allow  the provincial  Trabajar  office
11to improve targeting relative to the UBN data. Clearly, any assessment of targeting performance
with respect to the UBN index by department must allow for an error term reflecting unobserved
variables independent of the UBN index.
To assess performance one can compare the Trabajar allocation per capita with the
percentage of the population with unmet basic needs.  I shall measure targeting performance by
the expected difference in spending between an area in which there are no households with
unmet basic needs and one in which every household has unmet basic needs. I call this the "poor-
area targeting (PAT) coefficient".  The expectation is formed over the distribution of a zero-mean
error term embodying other determinants of spending in a given area and any measurement error.
If there is no difference in spending per capita between "poor" and "non-poor" areas then the
PAT coefficient is zero.  If it is negative, then the program favors non-poor areas; if positive, it
favors poor areas. The higher the PAT coefficient, the more  spending favors poor areas.II
To estimate the PAT coefficient one can run a linear regression of Trabajar spending per
capita against the poverty indicator.  There are in fact three PAT coefficients of interest.  On
regressing the Trabajar allocation across provinces on the provincial poverty measures, we first
have the inter-provincial coefficient, PATP, defined implicitly by the regression:
TPCJ - TPC = PATP(UBN - UBN) + residualc  (j=1,..,M)  (8)
where TPC 1 is the mean allocation to thej'th  province, TPC  is the overall (national) mean, while
UBN 1 is the unmet basic needs indicator for thej'th  province, with national mean UBN.  A zero
The PAT coefficient  is interpretable  as a measure  of "absolute  progressivity",  in that the absolute
amount  received  is higher  for poorer areas  (as distinct from the more common  definition  of progressivity
in which only the ratio of amount  received  to welfare level is higher  for the poor). Absolute  progressivity
12mean residual is included  to allow for other  determinants  of the Trabajar  allocation  and
measurement  error. Equation  (8) also allows positive  Trabajar  spending  when UBN=O.  This is
done by expressing  TPC  and UBN  as deviations  from their respective  province  means.
Secondly,  we can define  the inter-departmental  coefficient,  PATD,  by the following
regression  across  all departments,  irrespective  of their province:
TPCj  - TPCj  =  PATD(UBNj  - UBN) +  residualyj (i=l,.., Nj; j=1..AM)  (9)
where TPCUJ  is the Trabajar  allocation  in the i'th department  of thej'th  province,  and UBNy is
the percentage  of the population  in the i'th department  of thej'th  province  with unmet  basic
needs. Note that the regression  in (9) is run on all LNj departments,  where  j=l,..,M. Finally, for
each province  we have  a province-specific  PAT coefficient  from the regression:
TPCiy - TPCj = PA  TjUBNq  - UBNj) + residualy  (i=l,..,NP)  (10)
where  PATj is the poor-area  targeting  coefficient  for thej'th province.
Notice that the PAT  coefficients  are not unit free; the units are spending  per person with
unmet basic needs.  Corresponding  to equations  (8)-(10),  one can also define  "relative PAT
coefficients"  by normalizing  by the program  spending  per poor person.  For example,  the relative
PAT coefficient  for provincej is PATjUBNj/TPC 1. This is interpretable  as the elasticity  of
program  spending  with respect  to the poverty  rate.
Equation  (10) can be used to assess  the extent  of horizontal  inequality,  defined  as the
difference  in expected  programn  allocation  between  two departnents with the same  poverty
is  the more  relevant  concept  in this  context,  given  that  it is more  natural  to think  of an untargeted
allocation  (zero  PAT  coefficient)  as one  in which  all areas  get  the same  absolute  amount  in expectation.
13measure. Let UBN*  denote  a fixed reference  value. Then, on setting UBNy = UBN*  in equation
(10), the expected  allocation  from the center's budget  will vary by province  according  to:
TPCj*  =  TPCj +PATj(UBN* - UBNj)  (11)
(Notice  that this is the expected  value,  so that it already  averages  out idiosyncratic  differences.)
There is a mathematical  relationship  between  these three PAT  coefficients. The
Appendix  shows  that the inter-departmental  targeting  coefficient,  PA  TD, can be decomposed
exactly  into between-province  and within-province  components  as:
PATD = SSP.PATP  + E SSj.PATj  (12)
(total)  (between  (within
provinces)  provinces)
where
SSJp  =Nj(UBNj  - UBN)21Z(UBNU - UBNj) 2 (13)
and (analogously)  SSj isj 's share  of the sum of squared  deviations  from the national  mean
UBN.  For this decomposition  to be exact,  however,  PATP,  must be obtained  from an
appropriately  weighted  regression  (Appendix).  Given  that SSP  and the SSj's are the same for
Trabajar 1  as Trabajar  2, we can also decompose  the changes  in PATD straightforwardly  as:
APATD  = SSPAPATP  + I SSj APATj  (14)
where A  denotes  the difference  between  Trabajar  2 and Trabajar 1.
145.  Overall performance in reaching poor areas
Let us first look at how the budget allocation between provinces changed with the
program's reform and expansion. Under Trabajar 1, the PATP coefficient was 0.15, and only
significantly different from zero at the 8% level (t-ratio=1.86).1 2 This changed dramatically in
Trabajar 2. The inter-province PAT coefficient rose to 0.59, which is highly significant (t-
ratio=6.37).1 3 These are the ordinary (unweighted) PAT coefficients.  On calculating the
weighted coefficients (see Appendix), one finds that the inter-provincial PAT coefficient under
Trabajar I was 0.25, significant at the 5% level (t=2.12), while the weighted PAT coefficient
under the new program is 0.74, which is highly significant (t-4.85).
Clearly the reforms to the prograrn greatly enhanced the extent to which it is targeted to
provinces with high incidence of unmet basic needs.  However, this is clearly easier for the
center to control than is the allocation within provinces, which we turn to next.
Let us now ignore the differences between provinces, so as to assess whether the national
program is reaching poor areas, and how this changed between Trabajar I and 2.  Over all 510
departments, the PATcoefficient  in Trabajar 1 was 0.41 (t-ratio=4.29).  The coefficient is
significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  Trabajar 1 was targeted to poor areas, despite
poor performance in reaching poor provinces.  How did this change in Trabajar 2?  The PAT
12  The residuals  indicated  heteroskedasticity  and so the t-ratio reported  is based on White standard
errors, corrected  for any general type of heteroskedasticity  present in the data. This was a common
feature  of the estimated  PAT coefficients  so White  standard  errors are used throughout  this paper.
13  These calculations  are based  on actual disbursements.  These-differed  somewhat  from the planned
disbursements,  due to unexpected  differences  in demand  for the program. If one allocates  actual  total
disbursements  in this period  in proportion  to the planned  disbursements  and repeats  the above  test one
finds  that the PAT coefficient  is very similar, namely  0.52 (with at-ratio of 9.26). The deviations  from
the planned  disbursements  resulted in a slight  improvement  in the targeting  performance.
15coefficient over all departments rose to 0.80 (t=10.33).  So there was an improvement in
performance in reaching poor areas across the country as a whole.
How much of this improvement in poor-area targeting was due to the improved
performance in targeting poor provinces?  On calculating (13), one finds that the between-
provinces component accounts for 28% of the total sum of squared deviations from the mean
UBN index.  Clearly then, reaching poor provinces alone cannot assure that poor departments
will be reached. Using the decomposition in equation (12), one finds that 17% (=0.28x0.25/0.41)
of the interdepartmental PAT coefficient of Trabajar 1 was attributable to the allocation between
provinces; the rest was due to targeting within provinces.  (Notice that this uses the weighted
PAT coefficient, as required for the decomposition to be exact.) Under Trabajar 2, the share due
to targeting provinces by the center rose to 26% (=0.28x0.74/0.80).  There was an increase in the
contribution of the center's efforts to target poor provinces to overall performance in reaching
poor departments, though even so the bulk of the national interdepartmental PAT coefficient was
due to intra-provincial targeting.
Turning to the decomposition of changes over time, we have seen that APAT  =0.39
(since the PAT coefficient across departments rose from 0.41 to 0.80), and that APATP=O.50,
while SSP=0.28. Thus (using equation 14) one finds that 0.14 (36%) of the improvement in
targeting performance across departments nationally can be attributed to the center's  success at
better targeting poor provinces. The remaining two thirds of the gain was through better targeting
of poor areas within provinces.
Notice that this is a comparison of the overall targeting performance across departments.
Since the absolute level of spending is higher under Trabajar 2, the poorest department will also
16be better off than  under Trabajar 1 even  without  the improved  targeting. Consider,  for example,
a department  in which 42% of the population  have  unmet basic  needs-one  standard  deviation
above the national mean over all departments.  Under Trabajar 1,  this department  would  expect
to receive $16.10  per person,  over one year. Under  Trabajar  2, the same department  would  have
received  $32.31  per person,  over five months,  a gain  of about $16  per person  over Trabajar 1.
Clearly  then there was a large absolute  gain to poor areas under  Trabajar  2, although  a share  of
this gain was attributable  to the higher  total outlays  on the program  by the center. With the
Trabajar  2 mean allocation,  but no improvement  in targeting  performance  (i.e.,  assuming  the
PATcoefficient  for Trabajar  2 was the same  as that for Trabajar 1), one would  have expected  a
department  with 42% unmet  basic needs  to have received  $26.1  1. So about $6 of the gain  is due
to improved  targeting,  and $10 due to higher average  outlay.  ($10 being the difference  between
the overall  mean spending  under  Trabajar  2 of $19.72  and that under  Trabajar  1 of $9.70.) To
give a second  example, at a UBN  rate of 58%  (two standard  deviations  above  the mean, and the
poorest 5% of departments)  the gain is about $23,  of which $13 is due to the improved  targeting.
The higher the department's  poverty  rate the higher its gain from expansion  and reform  of the
program,  and the higher the share  due to the improved  targeting.
6.  Inter-provincial  differences  in targeting  performance
We have seen that although  the allocation  across  provinces  improved  greatly,  it remains
that two thirds of the gain in the program's  overall  performance  in reaching  poor areas was from
better  targeting  within provinces. The provinces  differed  greatly  in their success  at reaching  poor
17areas.  To assess changes in the intra-province spending, Table 1 gives the PAT coefficient for
each province. Figure 2 plots the coefficients for Trabajar 2 against those for Trabajar 1.
Under Trabajar 1, the province with the highest PAT coefficient was Salta, with a value
of 1.06. The province of Jujuy was close behind, followed by San Juan, San Luis, Cordoba, and
Mendoza. After these six provinces, targeting performance drops sharply.  Entre Rios, Santa Fe,
and Formosa have significantly positive but low PAT coefficients.  Twelve provinces had PAT
coefficients which were not significantly different from zero under Trabajar 1. Only one province
had a PAT coefficient which was significantly less than zero, namely La Pampa, although the
coefficient there was still small (-0.09).
The number of provinces which were reaching poor areas rose slightly with the expansion
and redesign of the program under Trabajar 2.  While the PAT coefficient was significantly
positive for nine provinces in Trabajar 1, this rose to 11 provinces under Trabajar 2.  There were
noticeable improvements in performance for 12 provinces (Table 1); nine of these were
provinces which had a significantly positive PA4Tcoefficient  in Trabajar 1. There was also
considerable re-ranking. While Salta had the highest PAT in Trabajar 1, it did not improve its
performance in Trabajar 2, and was overtaken by five provinces (Cordoba, San Luis, Rio Negro,
Tucuman and San Juan). Substantial improvements were made by Rio Negro, San Luis,
Tucuman, Santiago Del Estero, and Santa Fe. While achieving less substantial gains in outreach
to poor areas, La Pampa succeeded in switching from significant targeting away from poor areas
under Trabajar 1 to significantly pro-poor targeting under Trabajar 2.
What explains these differences across provinces in their success at reaching poor areas?
There is no simple correlation with the provincial poverty rates (the correlation coefficient of the
PAT coefficient for Trabajar 2 with the UBN rate is -0.07; for Trabajar l it is 0.27.)  However,
18there are clearly other factors to consider. The model in section 2 points to the role played by the
center's budget allocation to the province, as well as how poor the province is on average.
Motivated by that model, I shall consider the effect of two variables:
(i) The central government's allocation to the province.  We saw in section 2 that it is not
clear on a priori grounds what the direction of the effect of higher average spending by the center
will be on a province's performance in targeting poor areas. At low levels of spending, priority
may be given to less poor areas, which are presumably better positioned to propose and
cofmance projects.  Then poor areas will only be reached at higher levels of spending.  Or
possibly the provinces give highest initial weight to the poorest areas, so that poor-area targeting
deteriorates as spending increases.
(ii) How poor the province is on average.  The model in section 2 identified conditions
under which provinces with a higher poverty rate will be less effective in discriminating in favor
of their poor areas at a given budget level.  In particular, if a higher allocation from the center
improves targeting performance, and this is already pro-poor, then the higher the province's
overall poverty rate, the worse perfornance  will be at targeting the poor (Proposition 1).
However (to simplify the analysis), the model in section 2 treated provinces as
homogeneous in all other respects.  This is not of course realistic. The ability of a province to
reach poor areas will be constrained to some extent by factors which are not easily changed with
a new federal program.  The capacity of poor areas to mount viable projects, and get them
approved, will vary from province to province, as will the motivation and efforts of the local
program staff.  Some provincial governments will be politically more disposed to helping the
poor and/or keeping the allegiance of past beneficiaries of similar public programs.  To allow for
heterogeneity in provincial social preferences, I introduce two more variables:
19(i) Past performance at targeting poor areas. I will use the PAT coefficient for Trabajar 1,
which I interpret as a proxy for (otherwise omitted) attributes of the provincial government's
social preferences.
(ii) Prior participation in the program.  People who have already participated in similar
programs will no doubt be keen to get continuing work on the new program. And they may well
be a more vocal group than those who have not yet benefited from the program.  If provinces
tend to favor workers already participating in Trabajar I or similar employment programs, and
the lower levels of spending under past programs tended to favor the less poor areas, then this
may well constrain the province's ability to reach poor areas under Trabajar 2.  By this
reasoning, higher proportions of continuing workers (i.e., Trabajar 2 workers who were also in
Trabajar 1 or similar programs) will be associated with worse performance in reaching poor
areas.
Table 2, column (I), gives regressions of the PAT coefficients by province for Trabajar 2
against these four variables: the level of spending per capita under Trabajar 2, the average
proportion of the province's population with unrnet basic needs, the corresponding PAT
coefficient under Trabajar 1, and the proportion of Trabajar 2 workers who had also participated
in Trabajar 1.
The four variables have a significant impact on program performance in reaching poor
areas, and can explain about three-quarters of the variance in performance across provinces.  (All
four coefficients are significant at better than the 1% level.) Higher levels of spending by the
center resulted in improved performance, suggesting that less poor areas tend to be favored first.
Better past performance at reaching poor areas tends to be associated with better current
performance. A higher commitment to keeping Trabajar 1 workers employed constrains ability to
20reach poor areas. Controlling  for these variables,  higher provincial  poverty  rates were associated
with worse performance;  Figure  3 plots the relationship,  setting other  variables  at their means.
I considered  five variations  on the OLS specification  in Table 2:
(i) The regression  coefficient  on the measure  of poor area targeting  under  the old program
is close to one. Given  the many change  in the program's  design, it is questionable  whether  this
variable  should  be interpreted  as a lagged  dependent  variable  in the strict sense of that term.
Nonetheless,  Table 2, column  (2), also gives  the restricted  form in which the coefficient  is set to
one, and the dependent  variable  becomes  the change  in the PAT  coefficient  between Trabajar 1
and Trabajar 2. Other coefficients  are affected  little.
(ii) I tested for an interaction  effect  between  the UBN indicator  and the Trabajar
allocation  by the center;  a sufficiently  strong  negative cross-effect  between  these two variables
would mean that the center  would  do better  at reaching  poor areas if it were to target  less poor
provinces  (section  2). However,  this "perverse"  outcome  is not consistent  with the data. The
interaction  effect  was positive,  but highly insignificant  (a t-ratio  of 0.20).  The condition  in
Proposition  2 is consistent  with the data.
(iii) I tested Trabajar  1 spending  as an extra  regressor  in the OLS estimates  in Table  2. It
was insignificant  in both the levels  and difference  models (t-ratios  were 1.00  and 1.07
respectively),  and other coefficients  and standard  errors were similar.
(iv) I considered  the possibility  that spending  under  the program  could  be allocated  by the
center in response  to indicators  of provincial  ability at reaching  poor areas. This is likely  to bias
the estimates  in columns  (1) and (2) of Table  2. To address  this concern,  Table  2 also gives an
instrumental  variables  (IV)  estimate  of the model in which the average  level of Trabajar  2
spending  is treated  as endogenous,  using Trabajar 1 spending  as the instrumental  variable. The
21equation for Trabajar 2 spending (estimated jointly with the second regression in Table 2)
entailed regressing the log of spending per capita on the log of the proportion of the province
population with unmet basic needs (a regression coefficient of 0.808, with a t-ratio of 4.80) and
the log of Trabajar 1 spending per capita (a regression coefficient of 0.456, with a t-ratio of 6.39).
The IV regression for the change in the PAT coefficient is also given in column (4). The IV
estimator gives a higher coefficient on the program budget, and that on the poverty measure is
more negative. Otherwise the results are similar to the OLS estimates.
(v)  Differences between provinces in the PAT coefficients will reflect differences in the
absolute levels of both poverty and program spending. It is of interest to see how the regressions
in Table 2 alter when one  uses instead the relative PAT coefficients, obtained by normalizing the
provincial PAT coefficients by Trabajar spending per poor person (as discussed in section 4).
The results are in Table 3. The coefficient on the (relative) PAT coefficient of Trabajar 1 is now
significantly different from unity, and so I do not report the corresponding regressions for the
difference in PAT coefficients.  However, otherwise the results are similar to Table 2.
7.  Implications
The results of the last section indicate that provinces which received a higher allocation
of program resources from the center tended to be the ones which are more effective in reaching
poor areas. The results also suggest that the incentive to reach poor areas within the province was
duller for a poorer province.  In terms of the model in section 2, these findings suggest that
provincial demand for targeting poor areas is a normal good (in that higher total allocations to a
province increase the PAT coefficient).  The finding that provinces which are poorer on average
tend to target poor areas less well is then consistent with pro-poor targeting overall (section 2).
22Given that the demand for targeting is a normal good, poorer provinces will have a harder time
keeping within their budget constraint if they make any greater effort at reaching their poor areas.
We also saw in section 5 that poorer provinces tended to obtain higher budget allocations
from the center. This enhances their ability to reach poor areas.  So, consistent with the
theoretical conditions identified in section 2, thcre are two effects of living in a poorer province
which work in opposite directions: the direct effect holding spending constant, and an indirect
effect via higher levels of spending.  The empirical results above suggest that the direct effect
dominates.  The estimate of the joint model of the PAT coefficient in the previous section implies
that the total effect of a higher incidence of unmet basic needs on the PAT coefficient is -1.27 and
is significantly different from zero. (A Wald test gave a Chi-square statistic of 22. 1, which is
significant at better than the 0.01% level.)  So on balance, poorer provinces tend to be less
effective in discriminating in favor of poor areas within the province.
Depending on how the center allocates resources across provinces, this may yield
horizontal inequalities between provinces in how much a poor area with given poverty incidence
receives from the program.  The extent of such horizontal inequality provides an indication of
how much the federal system constrains the center from achieving perfect targeting. We have
found that the average allocation to a province under Trabajar 2 responded positively to the
province-level poverty indicator, but that targeting withini  the province responded negatively.  On
balance then, did higher poverty incidence in a province entail a higher allocation to poor areas
with given poverty incidence?
To address this question, consider a reference poor area with unmet basic needs UBN*,
fixed across all provinces. Figure 4 plots the expected value of the program spending, TPC* as
23implied by equation (11), for all provinces ranked by their UBN index. I give the results for three
values of UBN*, namely 20%, 30% and 40%.14
Four observations can be made from Figure 4.  Firstly, there is considerable horizontal
inequality, as indicated by the large differences in the expected program allocations to areas with
the same poverty measure. For example, a department in which 40% of the people have unmet
basic needs (about the fifth poorest percentile) can expect to receive anything from zero to five
times the national mean allocation, depending on what province the department belongs.
Secondly, the absolute magnitude of the differences tends to be larger the poorer the reference
area; the standard deviations (coefficients of variation) are 4.8 (42%), 8.4 (47%), and 14.0 (58%)
for UBN*s of 20%, 30% and 40% respectively. Thirdly, in almost all provinces, the poorer the
area the higher the program allocation. And finally, there is no correlation with how poor the
province is on average; the correlation coefficients with the province mean UBN are 0.11, 0.01
and -0.03 for UBN*s of 20%, 300%  and 40% respectively.
So the center's allocations under the reformed program were able to eliminate (in
expectation) horizontal inequality in the treatment of poor areas according to how poor their
province is on average.  This is consistent with finding that targeting performance tends to be
worse in poorer provinces. As noted above, the PAT coefficient tends to be lower in provinces
with higher average UBN, even factoring in the effect on the center's allocation of being a poorer
province.  However, equation (1 1), and the results in Figure 3, are giving us the expected total
amounts per capita received by a department with a given poverty rate.  This reflects the average
allocation from the center, as well as targeting performance of the province, given its poverty
14  The (unweighted)  mean UBN is 22.5%  with standard  deviation  of 7.7%. I also tried UBN*s of
15%  and 50%; these followed  the same pattern, but are omitted  to simplify  the figure.
24rate. Worse  targeting in poor provinces  is compensated  for by higher average  outlays  by the
center.
However,  considerable  horizontal  inequality  remained,  reflecting  the influence  of other
provincial  characteristics.  And it is clear that the central  allocation  did not provide  adequate
incentive  for better provincial  performance  in reaching  poor areas. Indeed,  the comparison  of the
IV estimator  with OLS  one in Table  2 does not suggest  that the center's budget  allocation  across
provinces  provided  any positive incentive  for better  intra-provincial  targeting. For if better
performance  at targeting  poor areas  was rewarded  by a higher budget  allocation,  then one would
expect  (ceteris paribus)  to see a decrease  in the regression  coefficient  on the Trabajar  budget
when one switched  from OLS to the IV estimator;  instead  we see the opposite.
This holds an obvious implication  for achieving  better outcomes  in the future, within the
incentive  compatibility  constraints  of the federal  system.  While  (under  the reformed  program)
the center's allocation  is responding  strongly  to differences  in provincial  poverty  rates, it also
needs  to reward provincial  success  at reaching  poor areas. And it appears  that this incentive  will
need to be even stronger  in poorer  provinces.
8.  Conclusions
The paper has studied  the performance  of a federal  anti-poverty  program  in reaching  poor
areas,  taking  the reactions  of lower  levels of government  into account.  Under  certain  conditions
(summarized  in Proposition  1), the governments  of poorer  provinces  will be less successful  in
reaching  their own poor, both absolutely  and relative  to their spending  on the non-poor.
Nonetheless  (under  the same conditions),  higher allocations  from the center  will improve
performance  in reaching  the poor, and it can still be optimal for a central  govemment  to target
25poor provinces when aiming to reduce poverty nationally (Proposition 2).  Motivated by a
theoretical model of targeting in a federal system, the paper has investigated these issues
empirically, by means of a case study of one specific program in Argentina.
A measure of governmental performance at reaching poor areas has been proposed,
namely the regression coefficient of the amount received on a welfare indicator. The national
regression coefficient across all local government areas (irrespective of their province) can be
decomposed to allow an assessment of  the contribution of the center's targeting of provinces
versus the efforts of the provinces themselves. The application here has been to poor area
targeting, where one level of govemment exists between the center and the poor areas. However,
the approach can be extended to allow other applications.  For example, there may be multiple
intermediate levels.  Or the target population may not be poor areas but poor people-so  one
models success at reaching poor people by different local government areas.
The paper has studied performance at reaching poor areas before and after reforms to the
Argentinean program. A substantial reallocation of program resources across Argentina's
provinces occurred when the Trabajar I program was replaced by Trabajar 2, entailing higher
total spending and program design changes to encourage targeting to poor areas.  There was a
marked improvement in the program's  success at reaching poor provinces.  Performance in
reaching poor areas within provinces also improved for half of the provinces. Overall
performance in reaching poor areas (irrespective of their province) improved nationally.  About
one third of the gain in the program's ability to reach poor areas was due to its greater ability to
reach poor provinces, the rest being due to better targeting of poor areas within provinces.
26The provinces  differed  greatly in their success  at reaching  poor areas.  History mattered.
The differences  in performance  after the reforms  partly reflected  earlier  differences  under  the old
program.  And efforts  to keep  workers  previously  employed  on the old program  in Trabajar  jobs
tended  to constrain  performance  at reaching  poor areas. Controlling  for these factors,  poorer
provinces  were less successful  in targeting  their poor areas, at any given budget  allocation  from
the center. At the same time,  a higher  provincial  poverty  rate attracted  higher levels of spending
from the center,  which tended  to result in a more pro-poor  spending  within provinces. But even
after factoring  in this effect,  poorer provinces  were less successful  at discriminating  in favor  of
their poor areas.
Higher  spending  on poor provinces  by the center helped  offset  their worse performance
at reaching  poor areas. On balance,  there was no difference  (in expectation)  between  how much
two equally poor areas-one  in a poor province,  the other in a rich one-could  expect to receive
from the program. Nonetheless,  given the other influences  on targeting  performance  within
provinces,  decentralized  program  placement  generated  considerable  horizontal  inequality  in how
much was received  by equally  poor communities  in different  provinces.
While  these results  illustrate  the limitations  of targeting  poor provinces  as a means of
reaching  poor areas  within a federal  system,  they also point to ways in which  better outcomes
might be achieved  in the future. The center  clearly  needs  to provide stronger  incentives  for pro-
poor targeting  by provincial  governments.  The allocation  to a province  should  depend  not only
on how poor the province  is, but how successful  it is at discriminating  in favor of poor areas.
And these results  suggest  that even stronger  incentives  will be needed  to improve  the
performance  of poorer provinces.
27The results are suggestive  in other  respects,  beyond  the issues  directly  addressed  in this
paper. The finding  that poorer  provinces  are less successful  at targeting their  poor areas suggests
that economic  growth  will help reduce  disparities  within  provinces,  by enhancing  the capacity of
poor provincial  governments  in reaching  their poor areas. By similar  reasoning,  persistently  poor
areas will tend to be associated  with persistently  poor provinces.
It is also tempting  to draw an analogy  with the problem  faced by international  aid donors
aiming to reduce poverty  globally,  recognizing  that their success  will depend  in part on the
policies  of recipient  countries. Similar  reasoning  suggests  that the governments  of poorer
countries  will have a harder  time targeting  their poor, which  will help perpetuate  poverty  in the
absence  of compensatory  aid flows. The latter  may also need to incorporate  incentives  for better
performance. Convincing  empirical  work to test these effects  in an international  setting  will no
doubt present  new challenges  for future research.
28Appendix:  Decomposing  the measure  of poor-area  targeting
The measure of inter-departmental  targeting  at the national  level,  PATD,  is simply  the
regression  coefficient  of program  spending  per capita against  the poverty  measure,  using the
department  as the unit of observation;  this can be written as:
PATD = ET(TPCU  - TPC)(UBNy - UBN)IEE(UBNy - UBN) 2 (Al)
The numerator  can be re-written  as:
El[(TPCy  - TPCj) + (TPCj - TPC)][(UBNU  - UBNj) + (UBNj - UBN)]  (A2)
On expanding  this expression  one obtains:
I(TPCj  - TPC)(UBNj - UBN)Nj + EE(TPCY - TPCj)(UBNy - UBNj)  (A)
noting that the other terms in the expansion  vanish given  that UBNj  = EiUBNUINj  and similarly
for TPCj. Thus one can re-write  the inter-departmental  PAT coefficient  as equation  (9) in the
text, where  SSP is defined  by equation  (13) and
PATP = ZNj(TPCj - TPC)(UBNj - UBN)ILWj(UBNj - UBN) 2 (A4.1)
SSj = Y:i(UBNU - UBNj)2 YIY(UBNY  - UBNj) 2 (A4.2)
PATj  = li(TPCy  - TPCj)(UBNy - UBNj)/li(UBArj  - UBNj) 2 (A4.3)
Notice  that (A4.  1) requires  that PA  77 be estimated  from the weighted  regression:
Nj'(TPCj - TPC) = PATP Nj(UBNj  - UBN) + residualj  (A5)
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31Table  1:
Poor Area Targeting Performance by Province
Trabajar I  Trabajar  2  Is Trabajar  2  An improve-
Province  1996-97  May-Sept.,  targeted  met since
1997  to poor areas?  Trabajar  1?
Buenos Aires  -0.044  -0.129 **  No  No, and
[134]  (-1.59)  (-1.73)  worsening
Catamarca  0.338  0.332  No  No
[16]  (0.71)  (1.14)
Chaco  0.279  0.343  No  No
[25]  (1.21)  (0.93)
Chubut  -0.085  0.382  No  Yes
[15]  (-0.04)  (0.96)
Cordoba  0.763  *  1.996  *  Yes  Yes
[26]  (3.97)  (6.38)
Corrientes  -0.030  0.656 **  Yes  Yes
[25]  (-1.60)  (1.67)
Entre Rios  0.192 *  0.270  No  No
[16]  (2.33)  (1.04)
Fornosa  0.165 *  0.027  No  No, and
[9]  (2.22)  (0.07)  worsening
Jujuy  0.936 *  0.987 *  Yes  No
[16]  (3.27)  (2.23)
La Pampa  -0.092 *  0.275 **  Yes  Yes
[22]  (-2.17)  (1.87)
La Rioja  -0.034  -0.191  No  No
[18]  (-0.11)  (-0.40)
Mendoza  0.492  *  0.664  *  Yes  Yes
[18]  (2.71)  (3.59)
Misiones  0.007  -0.204  No  No
[18]  (0.06)  (1.43)
32Table 1, continued.
Neuquen  0.022  0.023  No  No
[16]  (0.08)  (0.06)
Rio Negro  0.243  1.449  No  Yes
[13]  (1.65)  (1.73)
Salta  1.056  *  1.057  **  Yes  No
[23]  (2.29)  (1.86)
San Juan  0.908 *  1.209  *  Yes  Yes
[19]  (3.27)  (3.13)
San Luis  0.888 *  1.801  *  Yes  Yes
[9]  (3.01)  (4.02)
Santa  Cruz  -1.153  0.012  No  Yes
[7]  (-1.14)  (0.04)
Santa  Fe  0.169  *  0.690 **  Yes  Yes
[19]  (2.90)  (1.84)
Santiago  Del Estero  0.107  0.837  *  Yes  Yes
[27]  (0.89)  (3.13)
Tucuman  0.269  1.308  *  Yes  Yes
[17]  (1.63)  (4.56)
Note: The table gives the regression  coefficient  of Trabajar  spending  per capita on the
percentage  of the population  with unmet  basic needs for each province,  using  the
department  as the unit of observation.  (Tierra Del Fuego is excluded  because  there are
only two departments.)  Numbers  in [.] are the numbers  of departments  in each province.
The numbers  in (.) below each coefficient  are the t-ratios (based on White standard
errors). * indicates  that the regression  coefficient  is significantly  different from zero at
5% level;  ** indicates  that it is significant  at the 10% level. The third and fourth
columns  are the author's  judgment, based solely  on the information  in the first and
second  columns.
33Table  2:
Explaining Inter-Provincial Differences in Performance at Targeting Poor Areas
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Trabajar 2 spending  Trabajar 2 spending
is exogenous  is endogenous
PAT  APAT  PAT  APAT
Intercept  4.576  4.618  4.840  4.932
(4.67)  (4.99)  (4.63)  (4.76)
Trabajar 2 spending per  0.560  0.554  0.673  0.683
capita (log)  (5.21)  (5.91)  (3.69)  (3.49)
Percent of population with  -1.577  -1.592  -1.735  -1.777
unmet basic needs  (log)  (4.85)  (5.20)  (4.59)  (4.52)
Poor area targeting  0.941  n.a.  0.932  n.a.
performance of Trabajar 1  (6.80)  (6.57)
Prior participation in Trabajar 1  -0.024  -0.023  -0.025  -0.025
or other employment programs  (3.99)  (4.33)  (3.47)  (3.49)
R 2 0.731  0.525  0.726  0.513
Mean dependent variable  0.627  0.382  0.627  0.381
Standard error of regression  0.369  0.360  0.372  0.364
F-statistic  11.578  6.628  11.161  6.211
Note: The regressions  in columns  (1) and (2) use ordinary least squares.  Columns  (3) and (4)
uses  the instrumental  variables estimator  in which spending  under Trabajar  2 is treated  as
endogenous,  with spending  under Trabajar I as the instrumental  variable.  The dependent  variable
for columns  (1) and (3) is the PAT  coefficient  for Trabajar  2 by province,  while  for (2) and (4) it
is the difference  between  the PATcoefficients  for Trabajar  2 and Trabajar 1. There are 22
provinces.  The  t-ratios are given  in parentheses  (based on White standard  errors).Table  3:
Explaining  Inter-Provincial  Differences  in Relative  Performance  at Targeting
Poor Areas
(1)  (2)
Trabajar 2 spending  Trabajar 2 spending
is exogenous  is endogenous
Intercept  5.922  6.382
(3.26)  (2.99)
Trabajar 2 spending per  0.806  0.998
capita (log)  (2.62)  (2.51)
Percent of population with  -2.124  -2.392
unmnet  basic needs  (log)  (3.26)  (2.92)
Relative poor area targeting  0.420  0.409
performance of Trabajar 1  (5.66)  (4.99)
Prior participation in Trabajar 1  -0.028  -0.031
or other employment programs  (2.25)  (2.19)
R2 0.712  0.709
Mean dependent variable  1.057  1.057
Standard error of regression  0.756  0.761
F-statistic  10.527  10.353
Note: The dependent  variable  for columns  (1) and (2) is the PAT coefficient  for Trabajar
2 divided by Trabajar  2 spending  per person  with unmet  basic needs. (The PAT
coefficient  for Trabajar I is similarly  normalized.)  The regression  in column  (1) uses
ordinary least squares,  while  column  (2) uses an instrumental  variables  estimator  in
which spending  under Trabajar  2 is treated as endogenous,  with spending  under Trabajar
1 as the instrumental  variable.  There are  22 provinces.  The t-ratios  are given in
parentheses  (based on White  standard  errors).
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